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CHAPTER 3

The President’s NDU Speech and the
Pivot from the First Term to the Second
by Kenneth Anderson and Benjamin Wittes

O

n May 23, 2013, President Obama delivered a major address
on counterterrorism policy at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.—the first major national security speech
of his second term. Billed as a comprehensive statement of policy,
it represented a crucial pivot in the Obama administration’s
understanding of long-term counterterrorism policy. The firstterm speeches, as we have seen, mostly involved efforts to
explain—and thereby shore up—the public legitimacy of existing
counterterrorism policies. The stance of the speeches was chiefly
explanatory and thus inevitably somewhat defensive. The firstterm speeches put on the record a great deal more than critics
have been willing to grant. But the appetite grows with the eating,
and the clamor for the administration to say more about what it
was doing—and under what legal authorities—had only expanded.
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This speech was different. With it, the administration
pivoted sharply away from simply seeking to declare and justify existing policy and moved to describing the future direction of counterterrorism—and the law and policy that, in the
president’s view, should govern it in the long term. The speech
was ambitious in scope and, in some areas at least, marked a
significant departure from the framework laid out during the
first term.
We turn, therefore, to a close analysis of the president’s
NDU speech, examining it for both continuity and change
from the first term with respect to the categories we have set
out in chapters 1 and 2. We look here both at the speech itself
and at its accompanying documents, and try to address the
good, the bad, and the unanswered in the president’s words.
In broad strokes, the NDU speech was a work of both
significant virtues and significant vices—and significant contradictions. It defended robust actions under the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) even as the president
emphatically insisted that they must end. It defended drone
strikes—and promised new limits on them. It promised, once
again, the closure of Guantánamo and the end of non-criminal
detention—without giving any sense of what would happen to
those held at Guantánamo who could not plausibly face trial
but for whom release remains unthinkable.
On the positive side of the ledger, the speech elaborated
on then-Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson’s
November 30, 2012, Oxford Union address on the end of the
conflict (“The Conflict against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates:
How Will It End?”). It tried to imagine a post-AUMF world—
one in which some degree of return to normalcy coexists with
a maintenance of counterterrorism-on-offense and the capacity
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to deny terrorists safe havens in ungoverned spaces in which
to regroup and rebuild. This vision represents a potentially
important basis for long-term operational flexibility in a postAUMF world and seeks to propose stages by which to get
there. But it also signifies a post-AUMF, post-armed-conflict
world that uses the tools of belligerency and conduct of hostilities, and the laws that govern their use, rather more than some
of the present war’s critics understand in the term “peace.”
On the more negative side, however, the president’s presentation promised in key areas more end to the conflict than
Obama is likely to be able to deliver. In important respects, he
both sided with his critics in delegitimizing his own policies
and cut off policy options that ought to be on the table for longterm institutional settlement of contested counterterrorism
authorities. Whether one sees mostly virtue or mostly vice in
the speech largely hinges on how one interprets passages that
are legitimately—and probably intentionally—amenable to different readings. It probably also depends on what specific passages of the speech one focuses on. As we look here at the
speech in its entirety, our account is necessarily mixed.
Indeed, the positive and the negative aspects of the speech
are more than simply the sum of good policy points and bad.
The speech ran the risk—not just in its policies, but in its modes
of framing and justifying them—of wanting to have everything
all ways. It is not obvious at all that the Guantánamo policies
can be squared, for example, with the legal implications of the
end-of-the-conflict policies. In sliding over glaring contradictions, the speech seemed to want to have its cake and eat it,
too. Some of the contradictions might be bridged by time. As
we explain below, the speech can be read as proposing one
targeting policy for the duration of the AUMF conflict, another
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for the post-AUMF peace, and a third during some period of
transition between them. But for some areas—particularly
those where the president appeared to embrace, even wrap
himself in, the arguments of his critics, while nonetheless
reaching policies that appear quite inimical under those criticisms—the speech gave a sense of believing that a clever form
of words can make the harsh antinomies of the real world disappear. Perhaps clever words can do that—but only for a time.
There is much that is praiseworthy in this speech, but we cannot dismiss our fear that it hides the day of reckoning when the
profound contradictions of policy must finally end in tears.
As the speech was clearly intended to make varying points
to a variety of constituencies, its political background is crucial
to understanding the various ways it can be reasonably read.

The Political Background to the NDU Speech
The NDU speech responded to a near-perfect storm of political conditions that came together for the administration in the
spring of 2013. That hurricane had several constituent storms,
each of which created significant pressure on the president to
move the ball forward from what his administration had said
during his first term.
The first of these was the need to explain significant developments and policy shifts within the administration with
respect to drones and targeted killing. The 2012 election had
created new stresses on the permanency of the nation’s counterterrorism structures, precipitating a long set of bureaucratic
processes toward formalization of certain rules that had been
previously more ad hoc. The administration’s senior officials,
according to news accounts, had become increasingly nervous
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about the prospect of Mitt Romney winning the 2012 election
and inheriting tools of counterterrorism, such as drone strikes,
whose use was essentially discretionary within the very broad
legal limits of the AUMF.1 The Obama administration trusted
itself with these authorities, but the prospect of someone else
wielding them—particularly someone who might revive some of
the executive power enthusiasms of the Bush administration—
kept officials up at night.
The result was a confluence of two distinct motivations for
seeking a more permanent and legitimate basis for offensive
counterterrorism actions into the future: on the one hand, a
genuine institutional belief in long-run codification of policy
for future presidents, and, on the other hand, a particularly
political belief in limiting the discretionary use by Republicans
of such things as drones. Mixed motivations notwithstanding,
the impulse toward codification of principles of both permission and limitation was a sound one. And by the beginning of
its second term, the administration was far along in the creation of a formal set of policies—known as the playbook—
which was designed to institutionalize the rules for drone
strikes and to enshrine certain policy limitations that go beyond
the legal limits on targeting authority. By May 2013, these policies were ready for the president’s signature—and the administration wanted to announce them.
Other independent political developments were also coming to a head. One was a mass hunger strike at Guantánamo,
which threatened the legitimacy—especially abroad—of the
1. See, for example, Scott Shane, “Election Spurred a Move to Codify
U.S. Drone Policy,” New York Times, November 24, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for-drone
-rule-book.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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already uneasy truce between the president and Congress over
detention policy at Guantánamo. Obama had never really
accepted this truce, anyway—a truce under which Guantánamo remained open, detainees could not be transferred from
it, but the government brought no new detainees there either
and the administration maintained a public posture of seeking
the facility’s closure. The hunger strike, and then the forced
feeding of detainees, put the question of indefinite detention
without charges or trial squarely back on the political table.
Though, legally speaking, nothing had changed, activists were
talking about a “crisis” at Guantánamo, and the administration
was feeling considerable heat.
This problem dovetailed with increasing talk of the end of
the conflict—the subject about which Jeh Johnson had spoken
the previous December. Johnson’s speech had given hope to the
nongovernmental organization community, which saw in the
end of the conflict, at once, an end to the lawful right to detain
terrorists as a legal incident of warfare, a mechanism to bring
about the closure of Guantánamo, and an end—or at least a
radical constriction—of kinetic military operations overseas.
This vision on the part of the activists gelled nicely with aspects
of the president’s own self-image; Obama, after all, has long
seen himself as the man who has sought to bring to a close the
American military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan that he inherited from his predecessor. The idea of bringing about an end to
the AUMF conflict, and thereby bringing about a true restoration of peace, clearly has internal resonance for him as well.
Also pushing the administration to speak were the effects
of the concerted NGO and journalistic efforts to challenge the
administration’s claims of minimal, occasionally even nearzero, civilian casualties in drone strikes. In one infamous epi-
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sode, John Brennan (at the time Obama’s top counterterrorism
adviser) had made the mistake of advancing the frankly absurd
proposition that there had been no—that is to say, zero—civilian collateral deaths from drone strikes in 2011.2 Activists had
responded to the evident absurdity of that claim with questionable estimates of civilian harm of their own, ones that surely
overstated civilian deaths.3 After a period of several years of
debate over civilian casualties, the issue had become a potent
source of attack on the administration’s policies.
Finally, there was the emergence of a new group of critics
on the political right: the libertarian wing of the Republican
Party, led by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY). In a peculiar merger
of the civil libertarian language of the Left and the Right’s own
opposition to regulatory excess and governmental power, this
group brandished the ideological claim that Obama had created an imperial presidency that ruled by decree, administrative rule-making, and executive order both in the domestic
sphere and in foreign affairs and national security. It also
adopted ACLU-like anxieties about the drone strike against
Anwar al-Awlaki, the American citizen, executed—on this
view—by the president on his sole say-so following his denomination as a terrorist solely by the executive and blown up with
a missile without a judicial hearing. Leave aside the actual facts
of the al-Awlaki case, the man’s operational role in some of the
2. Scott Shane, “C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes,”
New York Times, August 11, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html.
3. For an excellent overview of civilian deaths in drone strikes and the
controversy over it, see Ritika Singh, “A Meta-Study of Drone Strike Casualties,” Lawfare, July 22, 2013, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com
/2013/07/a-meta-study-of-drone-strike-casualties/.
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worst terrorist near-misses of the previous several years, and
the implausibility of his capture. Al-Awlaki was offered purely
as an abstraction. From this, the claim broadened to encompass the possibility of drone strikes, as Senator Ted Cruz
(R-TX) put it, against “a US citizen on US soil who is not flying
a plane into a building, who is not robbing a bank, who is not
pointing a bazooka at the Pentagon, but who is simply sitting
quietly at a cafe, peaceably enjoying breakfast.”4 What law, in
other words, stops the imperial president from secretly naming
some citizen a terrorist and blowing him up with a drone strike
on US soil?
This strain of thought exploded onto the public’s radar
screen in Senator Paul’s famous thirteen-hour filibuster on the
Senate floor on March 6, 2013. Paul’s impassioned rhetoric
and demands for simple answers to questions about when and
where American citizens could be targeted reached directly to
anxieties felt by Americans on the right, as well as many on the
left. The anxiety about legitimacy and the absence of judicial
process was genuine and real, even if inchoate and not necessarily focused on anything that, in light of the facts, even made
much rational sense. Paul’s filibuster came in the context of
the confirmation of Brennan to head the CIA in March 2013.
Brennan was confirmed, but not without facing a raft of hostile
questions and not before he had promised more speeches from
the administration on counterterrorism.

4. Senator Cruz’s statement took place at the outset of the Rand Paul
filibuster, a full transcript of which is available at Raffaela Wakeman,
“Senator Paul’s Filibuster: Get Yer Transcript and Video Here!” Lawfare,
March 7, 2013, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/senator
-pauls-filibuster-get-yer-transcript-and-video-here/.
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All of this formed the political backdrop as the president
took the podium at NDU. This backdrop collectively amounted
to a multifaceted and intensifying argument over the legitimacy
of counterterrorism-on-offense, continuing detention, and the
fundamental building blocks of the president’s light-footprint
strategy. The president’s speech was accompanied by two written documents, each issued within a day of the speech itself:
a Fact Sheet released by the White House under the heading,
“U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and
Areas of Active Hostilities”; and a letter from Attorney General
Eric Holder to Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. The letter principally addressed, in
greater detail than had prior statements, the circumstances and
intelligence at issue in the al-Awlaki case and declassified
information both about the strike itself and about three other
Americans (including al-Awlaki’s 16-year-old son) who had
been killed in drone strikes aimed at others.
Taking the three together, the NDU speech constituted
the most comprehensive single statement to date of the US
government’s present and future policies for counterterrorism.
And it laid out a vision that in some ways built upon the vision
the speeches described during the first term but that in some
ways was dissonant with that vision.

The Fundamental Nature of the Conflict
and its End
With respect to the immediate present, the president affirmed
in all significant respects the fundamental view of the conflict
that has lain at the heart of the legal framework for the Bush
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administration and the Obama administration alike: from September 11, 2001, down to today, the United States has been
at war. Under both “domestic law, and international law,” the
president reiterated, “the United States is at war with Al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and their associated forces.” In saying this, he
reaffirmed the fundamental view of his administration, laid out
in the first-term speeches, that the administration is entitled to
lethally target the enemy and, when it captures enemy forces,
detain enemy fighters and operatives for the duration of
hostilities.
The president’s speech also reaffirmed the fundamental
US legal view that armed conflict does not have a predetermined “legal geography.” The United States is legally entitled
to pursue and target the enemy wherever it goes, though limited by the legal rights of neutral sovereign states, who also
have legal obligations as conditions of their neutrality. The
president emphasized that America “cannot take [drone]
strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners and respect for state sovereignty.” But
Obama also reaffirmed the US view that “where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their
territory,” then the United States reserves the right to act on
their soil.
So far, there is no daylight between this speech and the
ones that came before it.
But new in the NDU speech was a clear statement that,
notwithstanding these legal authorities, as a matter of policy—
not law as such, and thus revisable according to circumstances—
the United States will now limit its conduct of hostilities in
places beyond the existing zones of active conventional combat.
Brennan had hinted at this position in his April 30, 2012, Wilson
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Center speech (“The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s
Counterterrorism Strategy”) with his suggestion that the United
States does not target all of those whom it could hit lawfully. But
the president’s NDU speech and, particularly, the Fact Sheet,
whose very title suggests different policy choices “Outside [of]
Areas of Active Hostilities,” went further. They made it clear that
an entirely different set of targeting rules governs US forces
outside of theaters in which force protection remains a matter
of high salience.
In principle, such policy choices are no different from
when the US military limits its combat activities in any place
of active hostilities—adopting more restrictive rules of engagement, for example, as part of a campaign to win hearts and
minds in a counterinsurgency setting. In the course of a farflung counterterrorism campaign, policy and strategic considerations may include many factors that might reasonably cause
the United States to adopt more restrictive rules than the law
would demand. As the president noted, we “cannot use force
everywhere.”
But talking about such policy choices in the context of a
speech focused on winding down the war gives them a different sheen. Indeed, where the NDU speech really broke new
ground was in articulating the architecture of counterterrorism
beyond the current AUMF armed conflict—or, at least, in
beginning to do so. Apart from Johnson’s Oxford Union speech
in November 2012, the NDU speech was the first serious public consideration of when this war will finally be over and how
the United States will pursue counterterrorism as a matter of
law and policy beyond the AUMF conflict. What’s more, unlike
Johnson’s speech, the president’s NDU speech offered a window into the time frame for the conflict’s end.
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The window was more a matter of hints and tea leaves than
clear signaling. But the president seemed to attach significance
to the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, and he talked
about the conflict’s end as a matter of urgency both in general
terms and with respect to detention. The most direct signaling
occurred near the speech’s end, when he said that he looked
“forward to engaging Congress and the American people in
efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate.”
He added that he would “not sign laws designed to expand this
mandate further.” If this is so, it appears likely that, under the
framework of the NDU speech and the Fact Sheet, the AUMF
would be retired in stages.
The president made four fundamental assertions regarding
the end of the conflict: first, that America cannot live with
permanent war; second, that threats today look increasingly
similar to those from before September 11, 2001; third, that it
is time to recognize criteria for the end of the AUMF conflict,
narrow the AUMF, and put it on a path toward repeal; and,
fourth, that we should make a transition to legal policies for
drone warfare and other self-defense actions suited to a postconflict regime. Each of these propositions is controversial and
contested, and we examine each in turn.
Obama began with the almost philosophical idea—at once
abstract and emotionally suggestive—that the American
republic cannot live with “permanent” war. He quoted James
Madison’s warning: “No nation could preserve its freedom in
the midst of continual warfare.”5 After a dozen years of war, he
said, America is “at a crossroads” and we must “define the
nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us.”
5. James Madison, “Political Observations,” April 20, 1795.
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In framing the issue thus, the president solidly allied himself with the Left’s critics of his administration’s policies. Having waged the war for four years, the president was now warning
about the dangers of continuing to do so. It is hard to quarrel
with Obama’s aspiration here; nobody wants a perpetual armed
conflict. The trouble is that the United States is not the only
party to the conflict with a vote on its nature. America can
define the struggle however it likes, but the realism of that
definition also depends on how its terrorist adversaries frame
it and how able they are to make a reality of their understanding. Mere forms of words do not vanquish hard threats, and
winning is more than a matter of verbal definition. Put a different way, it is possible that while America may no longer be
interested in war, war remains interested in America. And the
aspiration does not answer the question of how war powers—
whose use may remain necessary—figure into a post-conflict
legal framework.
Obama’s second point was an effort to respond preemptively to this realist critique. Granted, the president said, our
“nation is still threatened by terrorists . . . but we have to recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that
came to our shores on 9/11.” After ten years of experience in
dealing with heightened security efforts at home and war
abroad, this is the “moment to ask ourselves hard questions—
about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront
them.” As a definition of victory in this war, no president can
“promise the total defeat of terror,” he said. Our enemies are
groups and networks of groups, and the meaning of victory and
defeat must correspond to what they are. Today, the president
continued, the “core of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan
is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more
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time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us.”
They did not direct the attacks in either “Benghazi or Boston.
They’ve not carried out a successful attack on our homeland
since 9/11.” While preserving the caution that the core of
Al Qaeda is on the path to defeat, the president emphasized
that the threat today is more diffuse in terms of groups, terrorist networks, and affiliates, and in terms of geography.
The NDU speech didn’t soft-pedal the dangers of these
diffuse groups. The president singled out Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—the Al Qaeda affiliate which counted Anwar
al-Awlaki as an operational leader—as the most active in plotting against the US homeland. At the same time, he noted,
extremists have gained a “foothold in countries like Libya and
Syria,” but the ability of these groups to focus and reach beyond
those countries and regions where they are based is limited.
The result is likely to be more localized threats to Western
interests, including to business interests and to allied governments seeking to battle these groups in their own territories.
Further, Obama said, there is a “real threat from radicalized
individuals here in the United States.” The current, direct
threats to the United States and its people, then, according to
the president, are “lethal yet less capable Al Qaeda affiliates;
threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism.”
And this, the president said, is all but enough to declare
victory in the armed conflict. Indeed, the president, in arguing
for moving toward the conflict’s formal legal end, declared that
the “scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks
we faced before 9/11.”
Again, it’s hard to fault the aspiration. But the president’s
vision of victory—predicated as it is on the threat picture’s
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resemblance to the pre-9/11 era—does not obviously support
his conclusion. It would be of scant comfort to those who
would use the tools of warfare to deal with overseas terrorists
to learn that the president would be satisfied with having
merely wound back the threats to those of the pre-9/11 era and
thus concluded that we can now safely return to the thinking,
planning, and responses of the years preceding that day. After
all, it was precisely because we did not adequately contemplate, by September 10, the emergence of groups that could
carry out a 9/11-like attack that the attack was successful. We
failed to anticipate such events and, as a result, we failed to
take the kinds of forcible actions in the 1990s that might have
rendered much less safe and usable the safe havens where the
terrorist groups were able to plan and execute a highly complex,
years-long enterprise.
Obama’s third proposition was something of a response to
this concern. For Obama clearly didn’t mean to embrace such
an abandonment of military options in confronting emergent,
incipient, and ongoing terrorist threats. He appeared to imagine something more intermediate: maintaining key aspects of
counterterrorism-on-offense, while yet calling it peace.
This would be a peace of unusual military muscularity, one
that may well not satisfy the Left’s critics who share the president’s vision of the conflict’s end, but for whom this military
(and CIA paramilitary) muscularity would represent a contradiction, even hypocrisy. One way to imagine this peace is as
analogous to the peace of the Cold War, in which a struggle
was indeed underway, but only a hot conflict in dribs and drabs
over the course of sixty years. More often, it took the form of
proxy wars fought on the fringes of the great powers, with
military or paramilitary intelligence forces used in small-scale
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belligerent actions short of full-on war. Another way to understand it as peace is simply to look to the past 150 years of
American history; the number of years in which, even during
times generally regarded as “peacetime” by most people, the
United States was not engaged in forms of belligerency and the
use of hostilities short of full-scale war by its forces abroad is
very small.6 Small-scale military or paramilitary actions using
tools of hostilities have been a feature of American peacetime
for most of its history, and the same is true of many other great
powers. The idea of an absolute binary in international or
domestic law, between “armed conflicts” conceived as full-on
war and all other extraterritorial situations being necessarily
governed by human rights law and law enforcement tools, is by
far the historical novelty, not the norm. This figures as part of
the deep architecture of the president’s speech, because its
conception of a return to normalcy contemplates a return to
this historical norm; the president clearly did not regard the
speech’s repeated references to using drones and other forms
of hostilities even in time of peace as inventing anything new
but, instead, as part of the ordinary, realistic conditions of
peace. He was not wrong about that.
This deep architecture about what normal uses of force are
needed even in peacetime informs how Obama framed the
6. Mary L. Dudziak, in War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), provides a useful timeline (in
its appendix) of US uses of military force over its history, as shown by its
award of campaign medals, along with a discussion of how much a continuous part of American history military operations are even in times understood as “peace.” See the book reviews by Samuel Moyn, May 24, 2012,
on Lawfare, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/war-time-an
-idea-its-history-its-consequences/, and Kenneth Anderson, “Time Out of
Joint,” 91 Texas Law Review 859 (May 2013).
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conditions for what it means for the conflict to be over—which
he framed in terms of a reduction in the general threat level
against the homeland and the American people to levels more
closely associated with pre-9/11 conditions. But since those
responses were lacking in crucial respects, the conditions for
the end of the conflict also implicitly include some permanent
infrastructure for addressing threats in the form of plots, individuals, groups, and networks of groups—an architecture that
is manifestly not just a robust form of law enforcement or the
criminal law. We have learned from bitter experience, the president said, that “left unchecked, these threats can grow.” And
we have learned that if “dealt with smartly and proportionally,
these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve
of 9/11.” The president was not talking about just the FBI here.
In other words, even as Obama insisted that “this war, like
all wars, must end,” he also declared in the same sentence that
“our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must
continue.” Even as he quoted Madison on the dangers of perpetual warfare, he also declared that American policy should
aim to “dismantle networks that pose a direct danger and make
it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend.” Even as he
promised to bring combat operations in Afghanistan to an end,
he also promised “a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten
America.”
To put it simply, the conditions of the “end of the conflict,”
in Obama’s formulation, seem to mean the reduction of threat
to levels that can be managed without large-scale warfare and,
crucially, without need for the legal appellation of “armed conflict.” They do not appear to involve the abandonment of
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instrumentalities of military action. Rather, the president
appeared to be describing ongoing belligerent actions—using
military or paramilitary forces—conducted under the laws of
armed conflict, in national self-defense, whether as a continuing response to a continuing terrorist threat or as a response to
newly arising threats.
But this formulation, and the long-run paradigm for the
peacetime use of belligerent or covert intelligence forces that
it proposes, raises issues of its own. The critic will instantly
object, and with no small justice, that giving up the legal framework of armed conflict has genuine legal consequences. For
example, it is quite unclear, as we discuss below, how the
United States can continue to detain people under the laws of
war whom it cannot easily set free in practice to the extent it
considers itself at peace. More fundamentally, giving up the
legal claim to armed conflict also makes much less clear the
basis on which the United States can conduct even limited
hostilities, such as drone strikes or Joint Special Operations
Command raids, against the various groups that the president
insists on dismantling or against new groups that arise and
count themselves the children or grandchildren of Al Qaeda.
Against some of these groups, at least, it seems neither legally
required nor factually supported to believe that the conditions
of victory have been met in the ordinary sense of destroying
and dismantling the enemy and its ability to conduct hostile
terrorist acts against the United States. Why give up legal
authorities, in both international law and domestic law, that
continue to be legally and factually warranted?
The NDU speech didn’t straightforwardly address this
question. It rested, rather, on the factual characterization of a
threat reduced to manageable levels combined with the norma-
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tive claim that a republic’s moral nature is threatened by permanent warfare. Together, these yield the conclusion that,
where the reduced threat permits, a state of war should end
even if that means giving up certain legal privileges associated
with war. Conservative critics will tend to question the factual
and normative premise. But the criticism from the president’s
left may end up being just as sharp. What’s the difference
between war and peace, anyway, if peacetime entails something that looks remarkably like the conduct of hostilities? In
one sense, critics on both the left and the right will be asking
the same question of the Obama administration: what is the
cash-out in real terms for giving up the legal framework of an
armed conflict under the AUMF? The Right fears it gives up
too much; the Left fears it gives up too little.
The president had an answer to this critique, but he laid it
out only very elliptically in his speech. The answer is that the
sort of ongoing but occasional use of force he described can be
justified legally as a matter of self-defense—and that this
authority is actually robust enough to keep enemy groups at bay
and incapable of projecting force against the United States.
Military or paramilitary means can be small scale, discrete, and
limited and can be conducted according to the terms of the
laws of armed conflict. The United States has done so since
the beginning of the age of international terrorism. It has a
long-developed international law jurisprudence that provides
the framework for doing this sort of thing, even outside of the
AUMF armed conflict. There might be many issues to be
worked out as to the proper standards for invoking rights of
national self-defense, not to mention issues related to when it
is appropriate to look to Congress or to the president’s own
authorities in domestic law for such operations. But the basic
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proposition of forcible belligerent responses to international
terrorism in particular, outside of and beyond those of the
human rights and law enforcement paradigms, has not been an
issue legally for the United States at least since the 1980s.
Hostilities with an intensity short of armed conflict in the legal
sense might still be very intense—intense enough, Obama
seemed to be saying, to stay on offense against the groups he
wants the latitude to dismantle.
At the same time, however, the NDU speech recognized
that there exists a meaningful difference between wartime
under the AUMF and peacetime. The return to peace thus
imposes greater restrictions on when, where, and against whom
the tools of war—drone strikes, most obviously—may be
deployed. These specific policies, mostly related to targeted
killing and drone strikes, constituted the fourth point made by
the president in describing the end of the conflict: specific new
rules and policies for the use of force as the AUMF conflict
winds down.
We turn then to consider the new policies that the NDU
speech and the accompanying White House Fact Sheet
announced.

Targeted Killings and Drone Strikes:
A Strong Defense—and New Restrictions
Although the NDU speech was billed as comprehensive, its
central core addressed targeted killing and drone warfare—particularly in light of the accompanying White House Fact Sheet
and Attorney General Holder’s letter to Senator Leahy on the
targeting of US citizens abroad.
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The speech is noteworthy on this score first for the president’s strong defense of drone strikes as ethical, effective, and
legal. To some degree, this aspect of the speech simply
rehashed ground that Brennan had covered earlier in his Wilson Center speech. But it was notable this time for coming
from the president’s own lips. After describing sometimes
alternative, sometimes complementary, means of achieving
counterterrorism aims, Obama acknowledged candidly that
despite a “strong preference for the detention and prosecution
of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed.” The terrorists flee to “some of the most distant and unforgiving places
on earth. . . . In some of these places—such as parts of Somalia
and Yemen—the state lacks the capacity or will to take action.”
Moreover, he said, it is also “not possible for America to simply
deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. . . .
[T]here are places where it would pose profound risks to our
troops and local civilians—where a terrorist compound cannot
be breached without triggering a firefight with surrounding
tribal communities.” In these cases, the local communities
pose no threat to the United States; in other cases, putting “US
boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis,”
the president said, and he offered the Osama bin Laden raid
in Pakistan as an example. The “fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an
extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous planning
and professionalism of our Special Forces, but it also depended
on some luck,” he noted.
It is in this context, Obama said, that the United States has
adopted the methods of drone warfare. And while he acknowledged that this form of warfare raises profound questions, he
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didn’t apologize for it. As to effectiveness, the president pointed
to terrorist communications found in the bin Laden compound
lamenting the effectiveness of the drones. As a matter of legality, he invoked armed conflict under the AUMF and later
referred to self-defense.
The president then offered a defense of the ethics of drone
strikes, describing them as the tool of war least harmful to civilians in many circumstances. There is a “wide gap,” he said,
between “US assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports.” He acknowledged as a “hard fact that US
strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in
every war. And for the families of those civilians, no words or
legal construct”—like lawful collateral damage, for example—
“can justify their loss.” But he then asked what the ethical point
of comparison should be; heartbreaking tragedies must be
weighed “against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of
terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties,” not
just among Americans, but in the “very places like Sana’a and
Kabul and Mogadishu where terrorists seek a foothold. . . .
[T]he terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll
from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes. So doing nothing is not an option.”
This is an important moral assertion by the president. The
unstated premise of many critics of drone strikes is that the
proper moral comparison for drone strikes is against the policy
of no use of military force at all. The speech insisted that this
is a red herring. The real alternative is the use of other weapons
systems or forms of kinetic military activity. Conventional airpower or missiles, Obama said, “are far less precise than drones,
and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local

18383-WittesAnderson_Speaking.indd 158

10/14/13 10:35 AM

159

The President’s NDU Speech

outrage. And invasions of those territories lead us to be viewed
as occupying armies.” In other words, the value of drones
requires not merely understanding their tactical value in a
particular attack, but an assessment of their strategic value
compared to other means that might have worse geopolitical
consequences.
Obama acknowledged the limits of what drones can do and
the problems of the global resentment and blowback they can
induce. But he nonetheless declared that they frequently provide the most ethical and effective tool of war. Neither “conventional military action nor waiting for attacks to occur offers
moral safe harbor,” he concluded. And “neither does a sole
reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services—and indeed have no functioning law.”7 It was the strongest defense of the administration’s
7. In this part of the speech, President Obama—probably coincidentally—channeled themes that the present two authors developed the previous
month in a debate at the Oxford Union. Compare the president’s comments,
quoted above, to the arguments on the subject delivered by both of the present
authors at the April 25, 2013, Oxford Union debate over the following resolution: “This House Believes Drone Warfare is Ethical and Effective.” Wittes
concluded:
Now from the other side you’re going to hear a lot of talk about civilian
casualties, and I want to be candid about this up front. Any weapons
system that you use—weapons are dangerous things. And when you
target people, people make mistakes, and that produces civilian deaths.
And drones are not different from other weapons in that regard—except
in one sense, which is that they give you more opportunity to do less of
that. That’s not to say there are not civilian casualties. There are.
Now one thing you will not hear the other side talk about, I suspect, with
respect to the civilian casualties is the question of the null hypothesis—
that is to say, what the alternatives are. What if you didn’t use a drone in
this situation? What would you do instead? Now often, drone opponents
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posture on drones given yet—and all the more important coming from the president himself.
But having defended drone strikes energetically, the president also announced that he was reining them in. Obama did
not immediately alter the hard legal framework and authorities
under which drone strikes take place. But he did, in promising
an end to the AUMF conflict, suggest that a change in legal
framework was inevitably coming down the pike. And he also
adopted new policies for strikes—at least outside of active
combat theaters—that anticipate these changes. These policies for targeted drone strikes, applied in the current AUMF
conflict, represent a significant policy determination not to
have recourse to the more capacious existing legal authority to
hit lawful targets beyond zones of active hostilities.
The United States recognizes the legitimate concerns that
many people have regarding a perceived ability to strike with
drones across borders at discrete targets with potentially little
attribution, transparency, or risk. It recognizes this both in the
legal context of the existing AUMF armed conflict, on the one
operate with a sort of assumption—I think it’s a lazy assumption—that
the null hypothesis is some lesser use of violence or maybe no use of
violence at all. Maybe it would be law enforcement. Maybe if you didn’t
use a drone in a particular situation, we’d have peace. We’d have nothing.
I think this is very, very rarely the case. And I want to be very candid with
you about what I think the null hypothesis is, which is often greater uses
of violence. The alternative to drone use in many instances is air strikes,
on-the-ground human interventions, and Tomahawk cruise missiles—all
of which have less capacity for discrimination, for proportionality, and
more capacity for civilian deaths than do drones.
Video of the debate is available at Benjamin Wittes, “Oxford Union Debate on
Drone Warfare,” Lawfare, May 3, 2013, available at http://www.lawfareblog
.com/2013/05/oxford-union-debate-on-drone-warfare/.
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hand, and in the post-AUMF conflict setting, on the other. It
has therefore announced policies to govern its targeting with
drones, both those attacks undertaken beyond areas of active
hostilities in the current AUMF armed conflict and attacks in
the future, post-AUMF conflict—thus merging to some degree
the AUMF conflict with whatever will succeed it.
These policies were described in the NDU speech, but
were laid out with greater specificity and organization in the
Fact Sheet. The Fact Sheet stated that these are “counterterrorism policy standards and procedures that are either already
in place or will be transitioned into place over time.”
These policies are something less than law; the law remains,
at least for now, the targeting rules of the law of armed conflict.
The policies are subject to change; the Fact Sheet added that
officials are “continually working to refine, clarify, and
strengthen our standards and processes for using force.” They
are also subject to waiver; the Fact Sheet noted that they do
“not limit the president’s authority to take action in extraordinary circumstances when doing so is both lawful and necessary
to protect the United States or its allies.” That said, they are
clearly more than just a discretionary policy declaration. They
are intended to establish a basic framework grounded in law
and policy together, one that can and will evolve over time,
within a basic legal paradigm of both international and domestic law. They are a framework meant to create a bridge between
targeting under the AUMF and targeting under the self-defense
framework of the regime to which Obama aspires to move.
One important implication of designing policy in this fashion is that the passage from “wartime” to “peacetime” is a transitional and gradual one, legally and in fact. The policies for
drone strikes are now largely the same for the AUMF armed
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conflict—outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan—as they will be
for addressing the “transitional” threats that remain and the
same as they will be for self-defense actions even once the “conflict” as such is deemed over. This is, we suspect, how the
administration squares the circle between the assertion that “this
war, like all wars, must end” and the promise that our “systematic efforts to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue”—
including with drone strikes. Analytically, the NDU speech and
the Fact Sheet preserved a transitional period under the AUMF
conflict in which recourse to the legal authorities of the current
armed conflict are still available, though in gradually diminishing
ways, as existing, ongoing enemy terrorist groups presumably
lose their capacities to confront America as a result of the continuing degradation caused by drone strikes and other American measures.
Eventually, this will give way to actions taken entirely under
what the US government understands to be its inherent sovereign right of self-defense in international law. Those rights of
inherent self-defense include, in the US view, the lawfulness in
some circumstances of using military and paramilitary force
against non-state adversaries.
The NDU speech and Fact Sheet thus appeared to address
three conceptually distinct legal periods: the current AUMF
conflict prior to the end of combat operations in Afghanistan;
the post-AUMF conflict of peacetime (but which will continue
to have ongoing and new threats); and a transitional period
between withdrawal from Afghanistan and the full lapsing or
repeal of the AUMF—in which the government might use force,
depending on the facts of the situation, based on the AUMF,
self-defense, or both.
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Targeting in Transition:
“Continuing, Imminent” Threats
At least as far as drone targeting outside of areas of active hostilities is concerned, the NDU speech announced a simple
device for harmonizing the rules of targeting as a matter of
policy through this transition from war to self-defense in peacetime. That is to say, the rules will be the same for all three
periods, whether the legal authority is the current armed conflict, any transitional period, or post-conflict self-defense.
Since the rules for the post-conflict period of formal peace are,
legally speaking, the most restrictive, the device works by
applying those rules as a policy matter to restrict conduct in
the earlier periods.
As a matter of both international and domestic constitutional law, inherent national self-defense entitles the president
to target people with lethal force, including with drones, in
situations of imminent attack. So the speech limited targeting
outside of active combat theaters to situations of “continuing,
imminent threats”; the speech and the Fact Sheet also used
the phrases “continuing, imminent,” as well as “continuing and
imminent.” This appears to tighten up the criteria for using
force in any given situation as long as the armed conflict continues. Remember, the administration’s earlier statements—in
the first-term speeches—had reserved the right to act in the
face of continuing and significant threats. But while Brennan
had mentioned in his September 16, 2011, Harvard speech
(“Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and
Laws”) that there was a convergence between the US view
and an increasingly flexible allied notion of imminence, he
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had acknowledged that a gap remained. And the United
States had not previously restricted itself to drone strikes only
in situations of imminent attack—except, notably, with regard
to US citizens. Now, however, imminence has become part
of the formula—albeit as a matter of policy, not yet law. As
Obama put it, “not every collection of thugs that labels themselves Al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States.”
The Fact Sheet adds that it is “simply not the case that all terrorists pose a continuing, imminent threat to US persons; if a
terrorist does not pose such a threat, the United States will not
use lethal force.”
How big a change this is depends on how one reads the
phrases “continuing, imminent” threat and “continuing and
imminent” threat—particularly in relation to the earlier standard of “continuing and significant” threat. The correct reading of this language remains a matter of considerable opacity
both in the speech and in the Fact Sheet. Do these phrases
mean that a threat must be both continuing and imminent—
with imminence further restricted by a requirement that the
imminent threat be continuing, not evanescent? Or do these
two words denote distinct categories, with lethal force lawful
against both continuing threats and imminent threats? Or,
in a third alternative, is this a way of saying that an “imminent” threat can also be a “continuing” one, in which the
concept of “continuing” broadens the notion of imminence
such that a threat is imminent in a continuous fashion? Or,
finally, is “continuing and imminent” some kind of collective
term of art?
In our view, the position most plausibly intended by the
administration here is that targeting is lawful against a threat
that is continuing on the part of some actor, and could result in
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an attack at any particular point in time—and therefore is
continuously imminent with respect to that actor, whether that
actor is a group, network, individual, or, for that matter, a state.
We believe this in part because the NDU speech and the Fact
Sheet referred not just to plots or even to individuals, but
instead to groups and networks. The president said that the
United States would target, with persistence, networks over
time; in that case, the imminent threat is posed over time by
the group, given evidence of its nature, aims, and past behaviors. Moreover, as we discussed in the prior two chapters, earlier statements by the administration with respect to drone
strikes in general and to al-Awlaki in particular describe a flexible, non-temporal sense of the word “imminent.” In particular,
they describe a sense of imminence that permits the United
States to go on offense and pick its own moments to strike—
certainly not being confined, as many of the speeches have
said, to a reactive posture of having to wait for threats to ripen
before striking. As the president further declared in the NDU
speech, merely waiting for attacks to occur, or holding off a
response until the perceived last moment in order to demonstrate a threat’s imminence before responding to it with force,
offers “no moral safe harbor.”
In other words, the current language likely reflects an
incremental narrowing of the previous “continuing and significant” threat language used by Brennan at Harvard, something
that brings the United States still closer to allied countries’
increasingly flexible conceptions of imminence. The exact contours of the shift, however, remain unclear. And this analytic
gloss on the administration’s view may not be correct. This is
an area that cries out for greater clarification from the administration in the wake of the NDU speech.
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The speech and its accompanying documents laid out other
limits on drone strikes as well. The Fact Sheet said, as an initial
matter, that it is the “policy of the United States” not to use
“lethal force when it is feasible to capture a terrorist suspect.”
This seems to go further than previous statements that it is the
unqualified preference of the United States to capture, rather
than kill. Rather, the language sounds increasingly like the feasibility language that Holder used in his March 5, 2012, speech
at Northwestern University and that the Department of Justice’s
2011 white paper used with respect to the targeting of US citizens: that force would only be authorized when capture was not
feasible. Indeed, Obama made it clear at NDU that under the
new playbook, “the high threshold that we have set for taking
lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless
of whether or not they are American citizens.”
Yet the president also made it clear that “feasible” is not a
standard easily or frequently met, and that the feasibility analysis includes both the risk to US forces and the risk to civilians
of attempting to capture the target. It also includes broader
strategic concerns such as those raised by the president about
putting US forces on the ground in countries like Pakistan and
thereby risking a “major international crisis.” In other words,
feasible does not mean feasible in the technical sense of accomplishable. It means, rather, accomplishable without undue harm
to other interests—tactical, strategic, and political.
The Fact Sheet outlined a set of other preconditions for
undertaking a drone strike:
• Near certainty that the terrorist target is present
• Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured
or killed
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• An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot
or will not effectively address the threat to US persons
• An assessment that no other reasonable alternatives
exist to effectively address the threat to US persons
These conditions are striking in that they appear to contemplate the evolution from the full availability of armed conflict
targeting rules to something much more restricted. That said,
it is hard to believe that the second “near certainty”—that noncombatants will not be injured or killed—can be a workable
formula, even in the context of peacetime self-defense operations. Kinetic military operations always carry risks to civilians.
And setting the bar for actions unrealistically high runs the risk
of raising expectations of perfection in targeting that simply
cannot be achieved. This risks, in turn, undermining the credibility of an otherwise ethically and legally defensible structure
when the reality inevitably falls short of the stated policy.
Finally, the president made a brief, passing reference to
what are called in the press “signature strikes”—the practice of
targeting groups of people based not on individual identification but on broader patterns of behavior indicative of belligerency. He referred to the gradual transition out of the Afghanistan
war and the need to protect US and coalition forces in that
transition from attacks in their counterinsurgency war. In the
“Afghan war theater,” he said, we “must . . . and will continue
to support our troops.” (It is likely that the phrase “Afghan war
theater” in this phraseology is intended to include border areas
of Pakistan and targets engaged in counterinsurgency operations operating over the Pakistani border.) This means, continued the president, that US forces “will continue to take strikes
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against high value Al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that
are massing to support attacks on coalition forces.” These strikes
are, he added, intended to wind down as the counterinsurgency war winds down.
This passage did not address, however, the use of signature
strikes in places such as Yemen, that is, outside of what the
Obama administration has acknowledged as active combat theaters. So it is not clear whether the same criteria that apply to
individuated strikes outside of hot battlefields also apply to
signature strikes, although that seems to us unlikely. This
question is important because while the United States has not
admitted as much, it appears to have been all but acting as a
cobelligerent of the Yemen government in its civil war against
a common enemy—using mostly airpower and, in a conventional way, targeting groups of hostile enemy forces. The president came closer to stating this directly than has any other
official on the record, saying in this speech that in “Yemen, we
are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory
from AQAP”—reclaimed, that is, an area the size of Maryland
with 1.2 million people held and governed by the insurgent
forces for nearly a year. The president went on to note this
same role in assisting a coalition of African nations pushing the
group al-Shabaab out of its strongholds and, even more notably, using drones and other assets to assist France in driving
Al Qaeda groups out of their strongholds in Mali.
It is not clear from the speech and its accompanying materials how the president means to continue using drone strikes
in such settings. It is plausible to believe, however, that in
circumstances where the purpose of the strike is part of—in
military support of—an allied government’s counterinsurgency
campaign against terrorist and insurgent forces, the adminis-

18383-WittesAnderson_Speaking.indd 168

10/14/13 10:35 AM

169

The President’s NDU Speech

tration will regard it as outside the framework the president
articulated altogether and simply view it as conventional warfare. On the other hand, it’s plausible also to believe that the
new criteria are centrally about Yemen and Africa. This is also
an area that is critical for the administration to flesh out further
in the future.

Targeting of US Nationals:
Defending the al-Awlaki Killing
As we noted above, the claim that Obama played judge, jury,
and executioner in killing the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in
a drone strike has been a potent driver of anger and angst on
both the political right and the political left. Targeted killing has
been at the center of a well-organized and increasingly vocal
advocacy campaign against drone warfare. The strength and
persistence of this campaign—and an awareness of its potential
to reshape public perception over time—led Obama to address
the al-Awlaki strike directly in his NDU speech and led Holder
to do so in his letter to Leahy the day before.
The president actually said nothing that went beyond
what Holder had earlier said in his Northwestern University
speech as far as legal standards were concerned. What the
president did at NDU, however, was to announce that he was
declassifying the fact of the drone strike against al-Awlaki, as
well as the fact of the deaths of three other Americans in
drone strikes, in order to “facilitate transparency and debate.”
And the president and Holder robustly set out the practical,
and quite damning, facts of al-Awlaki’s “actively plotting to
kill US citizens,” including with respect to the 2009 Detroit
plot and the 2010 plot to bring down US-bound cargo planes—
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thus moving the discussion off the purely abstract question
of due process for an American citizen. Holder’s letter contained more details about al-Awlaki’s role and reiterated the
legal standard the attorney general laid out in his Northwestern speech. The letter also noted—adding to the president’s
speech—that of the four US citizens known to have been
killed during the Obama administration by drone strikes in
targeted killing operations outside of “areas of active hostilities,” only al-Awlaki was specifically targeted. Holder said the
other three, including al-Awlaki’s son, were not “specifically
targeted by the United States.”
Yet even as Obama strongly defended the al-Awlaki killing,
he simultaneously and quite paradoxically sought to ally himself with his critics. So while he defended his actions, he also
acknowledged different ways in which oversight might be made
more robust, including more detailed congressional briefings,
an independent review board for drone strikes, or even judicial
review. On the latter two, the president was gently skeptical,
raising both constitutional and practical concerns:
Going forward, I’ve asked my administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to Congress. Each option
has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For
example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and
authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third
branch of government into the process, but raises serious
constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. Another idea that’s been suggested—the establishment
of an independent oversight board in the executive branch—
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avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decision-making without
inspiring additional public confidence in the process. But
despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging
Congress to explore these and other options for increased
oversight.

The president here—as with his discussion of the end of the
conflict—was trying at once to represent his own policies and
to align himself with his critics. The trouble is that Obama has
not at all changed his substantive views—that al-Awlaki was a
lawful target and that it required no court order to kill him—
and he is not, in fact, friendly to proposals to judicialize or
bureaucratize targeting decisions. He is willing to “engage”
such ideas and “review” them, but probably not to embrace
them or, were Congress to pass them, sign them into law. So
at the end of the day, he is signaling openness—sort of—to
something to which he is not, in fact, open so as to emphasize
a values affinity with a political base alienated from him on
targeting questions. But the dance is unpersuasive. And by and
large, the Left is unpersuaded.
Also in the fear-alleviating vein, the president addressed,
almost in passing, another point of increasing angst on both the
left and the right: the targeting of US citizens on US soil. This
was the subject of the Paul filibuster, after all. And the president attempted to dispense with it once and for all. “For the
record,” he said, and to “dismiss some of the more outlandish
claims that have been made” concerning drone strikes on US
territory, “I do not believe it would be constitutional for the
government to target and kill any US citizen—with a drone, or
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with a shotgun—without due process, nor should any president deploy armed drones over US soil.”
The central aim of this statement is clear, although—as we
noted in chapter 2—in many situations of ordinary law enforcement, US citizens are targeted and killed without judicial due
process. Moreover, the president’s “should” was less than an
ironclad commitment never to deploy armed drones over US
soil on behalf of himself and future presidents. Just as no president would ever forswear the possibility of using tanks on
American soil, Obama was rightly careful not to preclude the
possibility, senators Paul and Cruz notwithstanding.8

Denial of Territory to Terrorist Groups
Occupying a considerable space in the NDU speech was a
discussion by the president of strategies for working with allied
governments in Africa and elsewhere to ensure that radical
Islamist insurgents do not take control of entire political spaces.
Almost entirely ignored by the commentary on the speech, this
“territorial denial” aspect of counterterrorism is emerging as
among the new centerpieces of US counterterrorism-onoffense. Drone warfare must be understood as part of a series

8. For an explanation of why no president can entirely exclude the possibility of drone use on US soil, see Jack Goldsmith, “Of Course President
Obama Has Authority, Under Some Circumstances, to Order Lethal Force
Against a U.S. Citizen on U.S. Soil (and a Free Draft Response to Senator
Paul for John Brennan),” Lawfare, February 23, 2013, available at http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/of-course-president-obama-has-authority
-under-some-circumstances-to-order-lethal-force-against-a-u-s-citizen-on
-u-s-soil-and-a-free-draft-response-to-senator-paul-for-john-brennan/.
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of activities aimed at denying radical Islamist terrorist groups
territory from which to operate. The president’s speech contained many statements pointing to the need to deny these
groups safe haven. The president spent considerable time
describing the strategies by which the United States and other
Western allies are working with governments in Africa and
elsewhere, embracing them as allies in a common fight against
these terrorist groups.
Some emerging threats arise, said the president, from
groups that are “collections of local militias interested in seizing territory.” Some of them might be content with that—
though the destabilizing effects of radical Islamist groups
seizing territory within already fragile and lightly governed
spaces cannot be written off as a geopolitical matter independent of anything else. While “we are vigilant for signs that these
groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on
operating in the countries and regions where they are based.”
In that case, the US response will be partly one of assessing
the conventional geopolitical risks of instability. The United
States might subsequently provide aid ranging from security
assistance to economic and development help to prevent these
groups from growing stronger.
Obama also talked about addressing “underlying grievances
and conflicts that feed extremism—from North Africa to South
Asia.” Many critics will see this as a reflexive invocation of the
“root causes” thesis about terrorist groups—presumably a debate
that ended on 9/11—that served as something between a justification for terrorist violence and a reason not to undertake
robust counterterrorism. The criticism is not unreasonable. But
in context, the best way to understand the president’s comments
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probably relates closely to this idea of territorial denial. Obama
referred to the fact that the revolts in Arab countries have created openings for both political and social reform, but also openings for radical Islamist groups. These changes in the Arab world
touch on every aspect of US interests, from geopolitics to counterterrorism, and policymakers will have to take all of those into
account. Some places will “undergo chaotic change before things
get better.” In all these places, however, the geopolitical interests
of the United States are intertwined with the counterterrorism
strategies, and they intertwine with “all the elements of national
power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas,” including economic and development aid and efforts to assist countries and
societies in transition.
Obama in the NDU speech used the word “territory” in two
subtly distinct ways. First, the president referred to “remote”
parts of Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan after the end of the
US combat mission there, among other places, and said that
America has an interest in ensuring that “Al Qaeda can never
again establish a safe haven to launch attacks” in these nearly
unreachable places—remote places where terrorists are able to
train, regroup, and plot. Territory in this sense means small bits
of land, often inaccessible to the United States and even to the
notional sovereign states, where transnational terrorists hide.
Often, as the president explained, drones are the only feasible
tool for reaching them. Terrorist groups must be denied haven
in this sense—whether by using drones or, preferably, by using
drones and simultaneously strengthening the sovereign state
and its ability and will to control its own territory.
But a second strategic meaning of “territory” has emerged
in counterterrorism and has taken center stage in recent years.
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This is the case in which a sovereign government faces an insurgency by an extremist group that has aspirations not just to
control a tiny bit of territory for terrorist camps, but instead to
take political control of whole territories, perhaps even an entire
country. These groups form internal insurgencies with regional
or larger sympathies. They might have terrorist wings of their
own, or might be hospitable to foreign terrorist groups joining
them with transnational aims. The president said that the
United States acts, and will continue to act, in “partnerships
with other countries” on this front—pushing back against
Islamist insurgencies seeking to control territory and play host
to terrorists. The president specifically framed this as territory—as “reclaimed territory from AQAP” in Yemen, for example. The United States is helping a coalition of African nations
“push al-Shabaab out of its strongholds,” he said; US military
aid, including drones, helped “French-led intervention to push
back Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help[ed] the people of Mali
reclaim their future.”
The strategic aim here is clear, and it is the most important
area of growth in US counterterrorism-on-offense: locating
drones as part of a unified geopolitical strategy that puts emphasis
on ensuring that terrorist groups and Islamist insurgencies do not
seize whole political territories, put entire populations under their
brutal rule, and create country-size safe havens for transnational
terrorist groups.

Detention Policy and the Future of Guantánamo
Obama’s discussions of drones and targeting, and the future of
the conflict and its end, all had much to recommend them—
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though they had weaknesses too and raised plenty of questions,
as we have seen. But there were parts of the speech that were
just plain bad—political, naïve, and counterproductive.
Obama indulged most flamboyantly his broader tendency in
the speech to align himself with critics of his own administration’s
policies when he spoke about detentions at Guantánamo Bay—a
subject on which the NDU speech simply lacked candor and
seriousness. This subject represented the speech’s low point.
Obama’s justified frustration with congressional interference in
his efforts to close the detention facility has led him in this direction before. Only a few weeks before the NDU speech, he had
vented at a press conference that:
. . . the notion that we’re going to continue to keep over one
hundred individuals in a no-man’s land in perpetuity, even
at a time when we’ve wound down the war in Iraq, we’re
winding down the war in Afghanistan, and we’re having success defeating Al Qaeda’s core, we’ve kept the pressure up
on all these transnational terrorist networks. When we transfer detention authority in Afghanistan, the idea that we
would still maintain forever a group of individuals who have
not been tried, that is contrary to who we are. It is contrary
to our interests and it needs to stop.
...
I think all of us should reflect on why exactly are we doing
this. Why are we doing this? I mean, we’ve got a whole
bunch of individuals who have been tried who are currently
in maximum security prisons around the country. Nothing’s
happened to them. Justice has been served. It’s been done
in a way that’s consistent with our Constitution; consistent
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with due process; consistent with rule of law; consistent
with our traditions.9

The president’s comments here were bewildering, because his
own policies had given rise to the vast majority of the concerns
about which he so earnestly spoke. Remember that Obama
himself had imposed the moratorium on repatriating people
to Yemen. And Obama himself had insisted that nearly fifty
detainees at Guantánamo could neither be tried nor transferred. To be sure, Obama would hold such people in a domestic facility, rather than at Guantánamo Bay. But that does not
seem like a difference that makes detention at Guantánamo
inconsistent with our Constitution, due process, the rule of
law, or our traditions.
In the NDU speech, Obama once again draped himself in
the rhetoric of his left-wing critics while neither facing his own
role in perpetuating non-criminal detention nor proposing a
viable means of ending it. After offering legal, diplomatic, and
budgetary arguments against the facility, he declared that “I
have tried to close GTMO. I transferred sixty-seven detainees
to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to
effectively prevent us from either transferring detainees to other
countries, or imprisoning them in the United States.” He complained—rightly—about the transfer restrictions and he then
thumped his bin Laden-killing chest a bit: “Given my administration’s relentless pursuit of Al Qaeda’s leadership, there is no
9. Barack Obama, “News Conference by the President,” April 30, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/30/news
-conference-president.
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justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from
closing a facility that should never have been opened.” He then
announced that he was lifting the moratorium on transfers to
Yemen and that he was reappointing envoys to facilitate detainee
transfers.
Had he stopped there, Obama would merely have reiterated his long-standing case for doing detention somewhere
other than Guantánamo—a position with which reasonable
people might disagree but which surely represents a matter of
long-standing administration (and campaign) commitment.
But Obama then went further to make an in-principle case
against the sort of detention his administration has never, in
fact, promised to end:
. . . history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our
fight against terrorism and those of us who fail to end it.
Imagine a future—ten years from now or twenty years from
now—when the United States of America is still holding
people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of
land that is not part of our country. Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding detainees who are being
held on a hunger strike. . . . Is this who we are? Is that
something our Founders foresaw? Is that the America we
want to leave our children?
Our sense of justice is stronger than that.

Obama here was not-so-subtly linking the closure of Guantánamo to the speech’s broader theme, the end of the conflict:
During the past decade, the vast majority of those detained
by our military were captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we
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turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In
Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the
Afghans, as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law-of-war detention to an end, and we
are committed to prosecuting terrorists wherever we can.

The “glaring exception to this time-tested approach,” he said,
is Guantánamo. In other words, even as his administration has
defended the legality of virtually every detention ongoing at the
facility, even as it contends that all of these detentions are
authorized by the AUMF, Obama wags his finger at the public
regarding the judgment of history and the sort of America we
are going to leave our children. Yet he does so with no coherent
plan to end the detentions that are taking place at the facility.
The finger-wagging, after all, took place the very same day that
Obama lifted his own self-imposed moratorium on Yemeni
repatriations. So the finger-wagging might properly have been
self-directed.
What’s more, as Obama himself recognized, “even after we
take [all the] steps [he proposed] one issue will remain—just
how to deal with those GTMO detainees who we know have
participated in dangerous plots or attacks but who cannot be
prosecuted, for example, because the evidence against them
has been compromised or is inadmissible in a court of law.”
Yet for this group, Obama proposed nothing, saying only
that “once we commit to a process of closing GTMO, I am
confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent
with our commitment to the rule of law.” Obama, in other
words, offered no window into the basis for this confidence.
And it’s not as though these cases have never been reviewed
before. The president’s own task force, set up at the outset of
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the administration, identified forty-eight detainees (two of
whom have since died) who meet “three core criteria”:
First, the totality of available information—including credible information that might not be admissible in a criminal
prosecution—indicated that the detainee poses a high level
of threat that cannot be mitigated sufficiently except through
continued detention; second, prosecution of the detainee
in a federal criminal court or a military commission did not
appear feasible; and third, notwithstanding the infeasibility
of criminal prosecution, there is a lawful basis for the detainee’s detention under the AUMF.10

That number has surely risen in the years since, as the willingness to repatriate Yemenis has waned and legal rulings have
reduced the number of detainees who might plausibly face
criminal trials. Whatever the real number is today, there is only
one way to resolve the problem other than maintaining this
group of people in custody. And that is not maintaining this
group of people in custody. Is Obama really going to free Abu
Zubaydah—against whom a criminal case has not yet materialized? What about Mohammed Qatani, the would-be September 11 hijacker who was turned away from this country’s
borders in Orlando, Florida, with Mohammed Atta waiting for
him on the other side of customs? Until the president is willing
to say that he means to set these people free, pieties about
what sort of country we are, however earnestly felt, ring hollow
and are beneath the rest of the speech. Because whether
10. Guantánamo Review Task Force, Final Report, January 22, 2010,
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
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Obama faces it squarely or not, we are, in fact, the sort of
country that detains people under the law of war, rather than
letting them commit acts of terrorism against us.
And more to the point, he is the kind of president who
does so.
Detention is another reason it might be very difficult to
declare the end of the conflict to which the speech aspires. For
once again, the detainees get a vote as to whether they are still
at war with the United States. And some of them manifestly
still are. Obama’s unwillingness, even as he insists on a return
to the normalcy of peacetime, to begin articulating the steps
that true peace would compel—not just the closure of the
facility but the freeing of its detainees—suggests once again
that at least part of him imagines something less than real
peace is at hand.

Conclusion
Obama had words on other subjects, too. On the cluster of
closely linked issues that include secrecy and transparency,
surveillance and privacy, reporting and journalism, classified
information, leaks and leak prosecutions, he once again tried
to straddle a line between defending an administration that
has, in fact, been aggressive and sharing values with a base that
objects to that aggressiveness. The dance, once again, left a lot
of people cold—and rightly so. For Obama consistently put
himself on both sides of the issues. We must, he said,
. . . keep information secret that protects our operations and
our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their com-
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mitment to protect classified information. But a free press
is also essential for our democracy. . . . I’m troubled by the
possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative
journalism that holds government accountable.

Inhibiting investigative journalism that holds government
accountable—or, at least, the sources on which that journalism relies—is precisely the point of prosecuting leakers of
classified information. And troubled though the president
might be, the briefs filed by his administration express no
sense of doubt or qualification when it comes either to the
prosecution of leakers or to the demands that reporters provide information to investigators. Yet the president also called
for a “media shield law” and for the attorney general to review
guidelines for “investigations that involve reporters.” It was
largely a continuation of a pattern in the speeches of selfcongratulation for openness from an administration that is
not, in fact, especially open.
In this case, it also reflected a broad pattern within this one
speech of trying to straddle lines. Defending secrecy while allying himself with the reporters who erode it is of a piece with
defending detention while decrying it and insisting that we’re
not the sort of country that does it. It is also of a piece with
promising to end a war even as he also promises to continue its
prosecution. At its best, the speech promised a plausible bridge
across these apparent antinomies—as when the president
seemed to describe a transitional period between war and
peace with targeting standards that would be lawful across that
transition. At its worst, however, the speech sought to ally the
president with his critics at the risk of delegitimizing his own
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policies and the men and women who have to implement them.
Whether it will be remembered principally for the virtues or
principally for the vices will largely depend on whether the
transition he described materializes in fact and how the government manages it, if and when it does.
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